Ali ibn Abi Talib
Ali ibn Abi Talib (c.597–660), was the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, the fourth caliph of the Sunni Muslims, and the first imam of all the Shi’is. Ali was ten or eleven years old when he embraced Islam and is considered to be the first Muslim after Khadija, Muhammad’s wife. He grew up in Muhammad’s household, and during the night of Muhammad’s emigration (the Hijrah) from Mecca to Medina in 622, he occupied the Prophet’s bed, facilitating the latter's escape. He then joined the Prophet after restoring to their owners the objects that Muhammad was holding in trust. Some months later he married Muhammad’s daughter Fatima; of their marriage were born two sons, Hasan and Hussain, and two daughters, Zaynab and Umm Kulthum, the latter two known for their roles in the Battle of Karbala. During the Prophet's lifetime, Ali participated in almost all the expeditions, except that of Tabuk, during which he had the command at Medina. Ali's bravery as the standard-bearer and sometimes as the commander in these expeditions has become legendary.
After Muhammad’s death in 632, a dispute arose between Ali and other associates of the Prophet on the question of succession. It was this dispute that divided the Muslims into two major factions: the Shi’a (partisans of Ali), those sympathetic to Ali's claim that he was appointed by the Prophet as his successor during his farewell pilgrimage; and the Sunni, those who denied Ali's claim and acknowledged the caliphate of Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman in succession and placed Ali as the fourth caliph, following Othman's assassination in 656.
The period of Ali's rule was marked with political crisis and civil strife. Ali had inherited events which he could not avoid as a caliph, and under the pressure of circumstances he had to submit to these events and the constraints of his partisans. In the month of Ramadan in 660, a member of the Khawarij (a sect that had seceded from Ali in the battle against the Umayyad governor of Syria, Muʿawiya, in 656) struck Ali a fatal blow with a sword while he was in prostration in the mosque of Kufa. Ali was buried in Najaf. His mausoleum was built there, and Najaf has become an important site for the Shi’i pilgrimage and a center for Twelver Shi’i learning.
Biography[edit | edit source]
Ali’s life falls into three distinct phases: 1. from his birth until the death of the Prophet in 11/632; 2. until the murder of Othman in 35/656; 3. from his election to the caliphate to his death.
During the Life of the Prophet[edit | edit source]
When Muhammad was called by God to be a prophet, Ali, though only ten years old, became one of his first followers. The night Muhammad fled from Mecca to Medina, Ali risked his life by sleeping in his bed; he also carried out the Prophet’s request to restore all the properties that had been entrusted to him as a merchant to their owners in Mecca. Only then did Ali leave for Medina; there he married Muhammad’s daughter Fatima.
Ali’s courage during the military expeditions became legendary. Along with Hamza, Abu Dojana, and Zobayr, he was renowned for his charges against the enemy; at Badr he is said to have killed more than one third of the enemy army single-handedly. He stood firm and stoutly defended the Prophet at Ohod and Honayn, while the Muslim victory at Khaybar, where he used a heavy iron door as a shield, is attributed to his valor. He was one of Muhammad’s scribes and was chosen to lead several important missions. After the Hijra when the Prophet instituted brotherhood between the emigrants (Mohajerun) and the helpers (Ansar), he chose Ali as his own brother. The treaty of Hodaybia was written down by Ali. In 9/631 when Abu Bakr led the pilgrimage, Ali was delegated by the Prophet to proclaim the surat al-baraʾa (Quran 9) to the pilgrims assembled at Mena. He was chosen to destroy the idols worshiped by the Aws, Khazraj, and Tayy, and those in the Kaʿba.
According to the Shiʿites, the Prophet unequivocally nominated Ali as his successor at Ghadir khomm while returning from his “farewell pilgrimage” to Mecca. The Sunnis reject this claim, maintaining that the Prophet died without naming a successor. All the early sources present the Medinan Muslim community behaving as if they had not learned about Ali’s alleged designation.
After the death of the Prophet[edit | edit source]
At the Prophet’s death the community split into groups contending for political succession. The Ansar were about to proclaim Saʿd b. Obada caliph, but this was not acceptable to the Mohajerun, who considered themselves closer to the Prophet in kinship. Among them was a group led by Ali and his supporters, i.e., Zobayr, Talha, Abbas b. Abd-al-Mottaleb, Meqdad, Salman Faresi, Abu Dharr Ghefari, and Ammar b. Yaser, who viewed Ali as the Prophet’s legitimate heir. Muslim historians agree that a crisis was averted by three prominent Mohajerun: Abu Bakr, Omar, and Abu Obayda, who rushed to the gathering of the Ansar and imposed Abu Bakr as caliph. Their success was facilitated by the jealousy between the Aws and the Khazraj, the two main tribal factions of the Ansar, and the inactivity of the Prophet’s kinsmen in promoting their own cause. When Abu Bakr’s selection to the caliphate was presented as a fait accompli, Ali and the Hashimites withheld their oaths of allegiance until after the death of Fatima. Ali did not actively assert his own right because he did not want to throw the nascent Muslim community into strife. He retired to a life in which religious works became his chief occupation; the first chronologically arranged version of the Quran is attributed to him, and his knowledge of the Quran and the Sunna aided the caliphs in various legal problems. He did not participate in the wars of redda and conquest; his actions after becoming caliph seem to indicate that he did not approve of the policies of his predecessors. In contrast to Omar he recommended that the entire revenue of the divan be distributed without keeping anything in reserve.
During Othman’s Caliphate[edit | edit source]
In the period preceding Ali’s caliphate Othman was faced with problems arising from conflicts of interest between the traditional tribal and the new Islamic leadership. The so-called qorraʾ, the original conquerors from minor clans, resented Othman’s tightening of central control and felt that their interests were threatened by the growing influence of the traditional tribal leaders, who were newcomers to the provinces. This was the common cause of opposition in all provinces except Syria, which was kept free from uncontrolled immigration and was held in firm control by Muʿawiya, governor since 20/641. In mid-35/656 discontented provincial groups from Egypt, Kufa (led by Malek Ashtar), and Basra arrived in Medina.
In Medina itself opposition came from three main groups. First, a number of prominent Mohajerun accused Othman of nepotism and deviation from Islamic principles, e.g., the alteration of the number of rakʿas to be prayed at Mena and Arafat. Shortly before his death, Abd-al-Rahman b. Awf is said to have declared that Othman had departed from his promise to adhere to the Quran, the Sunna, and the sirat al-Shaykhayn, and he requested that he should not be allowed to pray at his funeral. ʿAbdallah b. Masʿud, who seems to have been dismissed from the Kufan treasury, ejected from the mosque, and beaten for criticizing Othman, is reported to have made the same request. Abu Dharr Ghefari, who was critical of Othman and Muʿawiya, was exiled from Medina. Ammar b. Yaser was beaten for his criticism of Othman. The second group of Medinan opponents formed around Talha and became clearly distinguishable from the first only at the battle of the Camel. It included Zobayr and Aʾesha, who were opposed to Omayyad domination but favored the Qoraysh. Both Talha and Zobayr had enormous income from their estates, mainly in Iraq, and their opposition stemmed from the strengthening of Omayyad power. Talha became vocal in his criticism of Othman, used his influence on the people of Basra to encourage their opposition, and was active against Othman at the time of the siege. Aʾesha, who had also played her part in fomenting opposition, left for Mecca when Othman was besieged, hoping that he would be killed and that Talha would become caliph. The Ansar, who had lost their influence under Othman, formed the third group. The appointment of Hareth b. Hakam as market overseer in Medina added insult to injury; they felt impotent in their own town.
In the meantime, Ali had acted as a restraining influence on Othman without directly opposing him. Making this point, Ebn Aʿtham states that Ali knew that Othman would not dare to act against him. On several occasions Ali disagreed with Othman in the application of the hodud; he had publicly shown sympathy for Abu Dharr and had spoken strongly in the defense of Ammar b. Yaser. He conveyed to Othman the criticisms of other Companions and acted on Othman’s behalf as negotiator with the provincial opposition who had come to Medina; because of this some mistrust between Ali and Othman’s family seems to have arisen. He tried to mitigate the severity of the siege by his insistence that Othman should be allowed water.
Caliphate[edit | edit source]
Following Othman’s murder most of the Umayyads fled Medina, thus leaving the provincial opposition in control of the situation. The strongest groups were the Egyptians, the Ansar, and the prominent Mohajerun. They invited Ali to accept the caliphate; reluctant, he agreed only after long hesitation, probably several days after Othman’s death. The sources suggest that before the murder of Othman, the Basran opposition group at Medina considered Talha as its champion, while the Kufans supported Zobayr; later both groups supported Ali. Thus, the situation in Hejaz and the provinces on the eve of Ali’s election was far from settled. His brief reign was beset by difficulties attributable to the state of affairs that he inherited. Moghira b. Shoʿba advised Ali against immediately removing all governors appointed by Othman, especially Muʿawiya; Abdallah b. Abbas also counseled him to proceed slowly, but responding to the demands of his supporters, he replaced Othman’s governors with his own, thereby setting off a series of reactions which culminated in the battles of the Camel and Siffin.
The Battle of the Camel[edit | edit source]
Returning to Medina, Aʾesha learned that Othman had been murdered and that Ali was caliph. She turned back to Mecca and actively participated in a campaign against him; her grudge against Ali stemmed from the incident of the slander against her (cf. Quran 24:10-20), when Ali had advised the Prophet to divorce her. Meanwhile, the Umayyads who had fled from Medina gathered in Mecca; they were joined by the deposed governors of Basra and Yemen, who had brought with them money appropriated from the public treasury. Talha and Zobayr, already frustrated in their political ambitions, were further disappointed by Ali in their efforts to secure for themselves the governorships of Basra and Kufa. When they learned that their supporters had gathered in Mecca, they asked Ali’s permission to leave Medina on the pretext of making the omra (lesser pilgrimage). They then broke with Ali, placing the responsibility for Othman’s murder on him and demanding that he bring the murderers to trial; they were joined by the Umayyads, whose objectives, however, were different. Unable to muster much support in Hejaz, Talha and Zobayr decided to move to Basra with the expectation of finding the necessary forces and resources to mobilize Iraqi support. When Ali discovered this, he set out in pursuit but did not succeed in overtaking them. The rebels occupied Basra, killing many people. Ali raised support in Kufa and followed the conspirators to Iraq. After negotiations for a peaceful settlement failed, the rebels were defeated in the Battle of the Camel, so named because of Aʾesha’s presence at the center of the battle mounted on a camel.
Ali entered Basra and divided the money found in the bayt al-mal (public treasury) equally among his supporters. This act may be taken as an indication of his policy to give equal value to the Muslims who served Islam in its early days and to the later Muslims who played a role in the conquests. He appointed Abdallah b. Abbas governor of Basra, and went to Kufa in order to gain support against Muʿawiya. He succeeded in forming a broad coalition which brought two more groups into his camp, the qorraʾ, who saw in him their last hope of regaining influence, and the traditional tribal leadership, attracted by his equal division of the booty. The successful formation of such a diverse coalition—comprised of men like Ammar b. Yaser (Mohajer), Qays b. Saʿd b. Obada (Ansari), Malek Ashtar (qorraʾ group), and Ashʿathb. Qays Kendi (a former redda leader who had emerged as a tribal leader in Kufa)—seems to be due to Ali’s remarkable character.
The Battle of Siffin[edit | edit source]
Ali opened negotiations with Muʿawiya with the hope of regaining his allegiance. Muʿawiya insisted on Syrian autonomy under his own leadership, but Ali maintained that all the provinces should share equally in problems facing the Muslim community. Muʿawiya replied by mobilizing his Syrian supporters and refusing to pay homage to Ali on the pretext that his contingent had not participated in his election. Furthermore, as Othman’s wali (near relative), he demanded the surrender of Othman’s murderers. Ali rejected Muʿawiya’s demands, asserting that he was duly elected by the people, who had the right to exercise their judgment, and that Othman had been killed because people were outraged at his arbitrary actions; hence they were not liable for punishment.
Toward the end of 36/657 the two armies met on the plain of Siffin. The confrontation lasted three months, most of the time being spent in negotiations. Finally, a week of combat was followed by a violent battle known as laylat al-harir (the night of clamor); the Syrians were on the point of being routed when Amr b. ʿAs advised Muʿawiya to have his soldiers hoist masahef (either parchments inscribed with verses of the Quran, or complete copies of it) on their spearheads in order to cause disagreement and confusion in Ali’s army. Aware of the divisions within the ranks of Ali’s camp, Muʿawiya exploited the situation. As the main purpose of raising the masahef was to bring about the cessation of hostilities, it is worth noting that the call for peace was addressed not to Ali but to the ahl al-ʿEraq (people of Iraq) who formed the bulk of Ali’s army, thereby isolating Ali from his followers by appealing to their regional interests. Ali saw through the stratagem, but only a minority was in favor of continued fighting; the most powerful tribal leader of Kufa, Ashʿath b. Qays Kendi, insisted on accepting Muʿawiya’s call, reportedly telling Ali that not a single man from his camp would fight for him if he did not accept the proposal for settlement. This refusal of the largest bloc in his army to fight was the decisive factor in Ali’s acceptance of the arbitration. With the majority of the qorraʾ also favoring a settlement, Ali stopped the fighting and sent Ashʿath b. Qays to ascertain Muʿawiya’s intentions. Muʿawiya suggested that each side should choose an arbiter, who together would reach a decision based on the Quran; this decision would then be binding on both parties.
At this time Muʿawiya seems to have made no specific reference to his earlier insistence on vengeance for Othman’s blood or return to shura. Most of the people in Ali’s camp, now satisfied, turned to the designation of the Hakam (arbiter) who would meet Amr b. ʿAs, the Syrian representative. The question as to whether the arbiter would represent Ali or the Iraqis (mainly the Kufans) caused a further split in Ali’s army. Ashʿath b. Qays and the qorraʾ rejected Ali’s own nominees, Abdallah b. Abbas and Malek Ashtar, and insisted on Abu Musa Ashʿari, who was opposed by Ali, since he had earlier prevented people from supporting him. Abu Musa was favored by the qorraʾ because he had stood for provincial autonomy, while Ashʿath b. Qays hoped to prolong the deadlock between Ali and Muʿawiya in order to check Ali’s power and regain his own former influence. Ali finally accepted Abu Musa.
The drafting of the agreement proceeded only after Ali had agreed to be referred to by name and not as amir al-moʾmenin; Muʿawiya objected that if Ali were indeed caliph, he would not have fought him. The main terms of the agreement were: 1. The Quran was to decide between the two sides; 2. the task of the arbiters was to reach a binding agreement; 3. the arbiters would be guided by the Quran, but failing to find guidance they would resort to al-sonnat al-adelat al-jameʿa ghayr al-mofarreqa. With the drafting of this agreement, Ali’s coalition began to collapse. The question of having recourse to the Sunna seems to be the main cause of the reaction of the qorraʾ. They had agreed to the arbitration because it was a call for peace and application of the Quran; the terms of the agreement had not yet been settled and there was no indication that Ali would not be regarded as amir al-moʾmenin. More serious was that extending the authority of the arbiters beyond the Quran to the vague Sunna compromised the authority of the Quran; it was thus tantamount to tahkim al-rejal fi’l-din (or fi ketab Allah). Thus, they raised the cry la hokm ella lellah (the jurisdiction rests with Allah alone). By this time the Syrians claimed that the document was an agreement that the Quran should be consulted as to whether Othman had been killed justly or unjustly, though the qorraʾ had no doubts that he had been killed justly. The raising of the question of Othman’s murder by Muʿawiya at this critical stage should be viewed in conjunction with his earlier evasiveness on the issue. The whole affair looks like a skillfully organized attempt to destroy Ali’s coalition. The qorraʾ told Ali that if he did not repent of his acceptance of the arbitration, as they had done, they would declare themselves dissociated (baraʾa) from him. On the army’s return to Kufa some of the qorraʾ stopped at Haruraʾ, but Ali succeeded in reconciling them, probably by making concessions. Only after returning to Kufa did Ali make it clear that he would not infringe on the arbitration. At this time those who had protested against the arbitration seceded from Ali’s camp (hence known as khawarej) and gathered at Nahrawan.
The first meeting of the arbiters appears to have taken place at Dumat al-Jandal around Ramadan, 37/February, 658, as stipulated in the agreement. The conclusion was reached that the acts of which Othman was accused were not arbitrary (ahdath), thus implying that he had been killed unjustly and that Muʿawiya had a right to claim vengeance. The verdict was not made public, but both parties came to know about it. Ali protested, stating that it was contrary to the Quran and the Sunna and hence not binding. Then he tried to organize a new army, but only the Ansar, the remnants of the qorraʾ led by Malek Ashtar, and a few of their clansmen remained loyal. He left Kufa with his new army to engage Muʿawiya, but first turned to Nahrawan to deal with the dissidents. He tried to enlist their support by declaring that he would fight Muʿawiya, but they persisted in their demand that he first confesses his sin in accepting the arbitration; after promising quarter to those who would submit, Ali attacked.
It seems that the arbiters and other eminent persons, with the exclusion of Ali’s representatives, met at Adhruh in Shaʿban, 38/January, 659 to discuss the selection of the new caliph. Amr b. ʿAs supported Muʿawiya, while Abu Musa preferred his son-in-law, Abdallah b. Omar, but the latter refused to stand for election in default of unanimity. Abu Musa then proposed, and Amr b. ʿAs agreed, to depose both Ali and Muʿawiya and submit the selection of the new caliph to a shura. In the public declaration that followed Abu Musa observed his part of the agreement, but Amr b. ʿAs declared Ali deposed and confirmed Muʿawiya as caliph. Meanwhile, Muʿawiya had followed an aggressive course by making incursions into the heart of Iraq and Arabia. By the end of 39/660 Ali, who was regarded as caliph only by a diminishing number of partisans, lost control of Egypt and Hejaz.
Martyrdom[edit | edit source]
Early one morning while praying in a mosque at Kufa, he was struck with a poisoned sword by a Kharijite, Abd-al-Rahman b. Moljam, intent on avenging the men slain at Nahrawan. Two days later, on 19 (or 21) Ramadan 40/27 January 661, Ali died at the age of sixty-three and was buried near Kufa. The burial was kept secret, but in the time of Harun al-Rashid his tomb was identified a few miles from Kufa and a sanctuary was established around which a town called Najaf grew up. Of his fourteen sons and nineteen daughters by nine wives and several concubines, Hasan, Hussain, and Muhammad b. Hanafīya are well known. Ali’s political discourses, sermons, letters, and sayings were collected by Sharif Razi in a book entitled Nahj al-balagha (“The road of eloquence”), well known in Arabic literature; the most famous of its commentators is Ebn Abi’l-Hadid ; a divan is also attributed to Ali.
Legacy for Shi’ism[edit | edit source]
The Shiʿites maintain that the Prophet designated Ali as his successor by God’s command; on reaching Ghadir Khomm from the “farewell pilgrimage,” the Prophet announced a congregational prayer. As the people gathered, he took Ali by the arm and made him stand next to him, and said: “O people, know that what Aaron was to Moses, Ali is to me, except that there shall be no prophet after me, and he is my wali to you after me. Therefore, he whose master (mawla) I am, Ali is his master.” Then he lifted Ali’s arm and said: “O God, be affectionate to him who is devoted to ʿAli, show enmity to him who is his enemy, give victory to him who helps Ali and forsake him who forsakes Ali. May the truth encompass Ali to the end of his life”. This tradition, which is accepted by the Sunnis but interpreted differently by them, epitomizes the Shiʿite veneration of Ali and their doctrine of the imamate.
The imamate of Ali is a cardinal principle of Shiʿite faith. Through walaya (devotion to Ali and the Imams) true knowledge of Islam can be obtained. The first three caliphs had usurped Ali’s right and the majority of the early community deviated from the rightful Imam. According to a saying attributed to Ali himself, those who fought against him in the battle of the Camel were “breakers of allegiance” (naketun), those who opposed him in the battle of Siffin were “wrongdoers” (qaseṭun), and those who fought against him in the battle of Nahrawan (the Khawarej) were “deviators” (marequn). Only the Batriya among the early Zaydis upheld the imamate of Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman, on the grounds that Ali did not oppose them. Considering him the most excellent man (fazel) after the Prophet, they permitted the imamate of the less excellent (mafzul). But from the 3rd/9th century onward the views of the Jarudiya, who rejected the imamate of the first three caliphs, prevailed among the Zaydis.
Ali, the wasi of the Prophet, was specially instructed and authorized by him on God’s command to assist him in his task. The Prophet brought the revelation (tanzil) and laid down the shariʿa, while Ali, the repository of the Prophet’s knowledge, provided its interpretation (taʾwil). During the Prophet’s lifetime Ali’s position was next to his and after him he succeeded him as the next most excellent man. He was divinely guided, infallible (maʿsum), purified from all defilement, and could not commit any sin, minor or major. He is the disposer of heaven and hell and the dispenser of drink (saqi) at the celestial pool of Kawthar. He will intercede with God on the Day of Judgment on behalf of his followers; he is the Guide for mankind, the Proof (hojja) of God’s existence to His creatures, and the Gate of His mercy. Salvation is reserved solely for those who declare their belief and devotion to him.
References[edit | edit source]
- in al-Sirat al-nabawiya I, ed. M. Saqqa, Cairo, 1936, pp. 262-64, Ebn Hesham states that Ali was the first male to accept Islam; see also Tabari, Cairo2, II, pp. 309ff.; Ebn Saʿd, III/I, pp. 12ff.
- Ebn Hesham, al-Sira II, pp. 298, 365ff., III, pp. 77f., 306, 349-50; Waqedi, Ketab al-maghazi, ed. M. Jones, London, 1966, I, pp. 68-69, 76, 145-52, 225-26, 228, 240, 244, 255-56, 259, 307-09, II, pp. 470-71, 496, 653-57, III, pp. 900-02
- the earliest historian to report the Ghadir tradition seems to be Yaʿqubi, II, Najaf, 1964, p. 102; see also Masʿudi, Ethbat al-wasiya le-Ali, Najaf, 1955; Kolayni, al-Kafi I, Tehran, 1388/ 1968, pp. 292ff.; Qazi Noʿman, Daʿaʾem al-Eslam I, ed. Fyzee, Cairo, 1963, pp. 14ff.; Shaikh Mofid, al-Ershad, Najaf, 1962, pp. 91ff.; in al-Ghadir fi’l-ketab wa’l-sonna wa’l-adab, Tehran, 1372/1952-53, Abd-al-Hussain Amini has listed all the available sources and references to Ghadir
- M. Shaban, Islamic History A.D. 600-750: A New Interpretation, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 16ff.; E. Shoufani, Al-Ridda and the Muslim Conquests of Arabia, Toronto, 1973, pp. 48ff.
- Menqari, Waqʿa Siffin, ed. ʿA. Harun, Cairo, 1382/1962, p. 91
- Balaḏori, Ansab I, ed. M. Hamidallah, Cairo, 1959, pp. 586-87; Yaʿqubi, II, pp. 125-26; Ebn Saʿd, II/2, pp. 100-02; Shaikh Mofid, al-Ershad, pp. 107ff.
- Balaḏori, Fotuh III, ed. S. Monajjed, Cairo, 1956, p. 549. Disagreement with policies of Abu Bakr and Omar can be inferred from an evasive answer he gave to Abd-al-Rahman b. Awf at the shura when he was asked whether he would follow the Quran, the Sunna of the Prophet, and the sirat al-shaykhayn or the policies of Abu Bakr and Omar; Tabari, IV, p. 233; Balaḏori, Ansab V, p. 22
- H. A. R. Gibb, “An Interpretation of Islamic History,” Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. Shaw and Polk, London, 1962, p. 7
- S. M. Yusof, “The Revolt against Othman,” IC 27, 1953, pp. 1-7; Shaban, Islamic History, pp. 60ff.; M. Hinds, “The Murder of the Caliph Othman,” IJMES 3, 1972, pp. 450-69
- Tabari, IV, p. 267
- Baladhori, Ansab V, p. 57; Ebn Aʿtham, al-Fotuh II, Hyderabad, 1968-75, p. 151
- Baladhori, Ansab V, pp. 36-37
- ibid., pp. 52-56; Masʿudi, Morūǰ II, ed. M. Mohyi-al-dīn, Cairo, 1964, pp. 348-51
- Baladhori, Ansāb V, pp. 48, 83; Ebn Aʿtham, al-Fotuh II, pp. 154-55
- Ebn Saʿd, III/1, pp. 77, 157
- Baladhori, Ansab V, p. 81; Ebn Aʿtham, al-Fotuh II, p. 229; Tabari, IV, pp. 379, 405
- Baladhori, Ansab V, p. 91; Tabari, IV, p. 407
- Baladhori, op. cit., V, p. 47
- al-Fotuh II, pp. 158, 164, 168, 184
- Tabari, IV, pp. 427ff.
- Tabari, IV, pp. 438ff.; Masʿudi, Moruj II, pp. 363-65
- Ebn Hesham, al-Sirat al-nabawiya III, pp. 313-14; Waqedi, Ketab al-maghazi II, p. 430; Ebn Saʿd, II/2, p. 29
- Ghalabi, Waqʿat al-jamal, ed. M. al Yasin, Baghdad, 1970
- Menqari, Waqʿat Siffin, pp. 29-32, 81-82, 86-91, 200-01
- Menqari, Waqʿat Siffin, p. 482; Yaʿqubi, Moruj II, p. 178
- see M. Hinds, “The Siffin arbitration agreement,” Journal of Semitic Studies 17, 1972, pp. 93-129
- L. Veccia Vaglieri, “Il conflitto Ali-Muʿawiya e la secessione khāregita riesaminati alla luce di fonti ibadite,” AIUON, 1952, pp. 1-94; idem, “Ali b. Abī Ṭālib,” EI2 I, p. 384
- Masʿudi, Moruj II, p. 408
- Sharḥ Nahj al-balagha, ed. M. Abu’l-Fazl, Cairo, 1965
- Kolayni, al-Kafi I, pp. 286ff.; Qazi Noʿman, Daʿaʾem al-Eslam I, pp. 14ff; see also Tabrizi, Meshkat al-masabih III, ed. M. Albani, Damascus, 1961-62, pp. 242-47
- Qazi Noʿman, Sharḥ al-akhbar MS; Ebn Babuya, Resalat al-eʿteqadat, tr. Fyzee, London, 1942; Helli, Sharh al-bab al-Hadi ʿashar, tr. Miller, London, 1958; Majlesi, Behar al-anwar, Tehran, 1376/1956, VII, pp. 326-40, VIII, pp. 16-63, XV, pp. 1ff., XXVII, pp. 1ff., XXXV-XLII, passim
Bibliography[edit | edit source]
- Hussain, Ṭāhā. al-Fitnah al-kubrā (The Great Trial). Vol. 1, Othman. Vol. 2, Ali wa-banūn (Ali and His Sons). Cairo, 1947–1956.
- Lakhani, M. Ali, ed. The Sacred Foundations of Justice in Islam: The Teachings of Ali ibn Abi Talib. Bloomington, Ind., and North Vancouver, B.C., 2006.
- Moojan, Momen. An Introduction to Shiʿi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʿism. New Haven, Conn., 1987.
- Shah-Kazemi, Reza. Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imam Ali. London, 2007.
- Vaglieri, Laura Veccia. “Ali b. Abī Ṭālib.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2d ed., vol. 1, pp. 381–386. Leiden, 1960–. Valuable revisionist outline of Ali's biography.
- Ebn ʿAbd Rabbeh, al-ʿEqd al-farīd, ed. A. Amīn, Cairo, 1948-53, IV, pp. 310-61, V, pp. 90-102.
- Jaʿfar b. Manṣūr Yaman, al-Šawāhed wa’l-bayān MS. Edrīs ʿEmād-al-dīn, Oyūn al-aḵbār II-III MS. Bharūčī, Ketāb al-azhār VI MS. Amīn, Aʿyān al-šīʿa, Beirut, 1960, III, pt. 1 and 2.
- L. Caetani, Annali. E. Petersen, Ali and Muʿāwīya in Early Arabic Tradition, Copenhagen, 1964.
- The following recent biographies are worth noting: Ṭ. Hussain, al-Fetnat al-kobrā, Cairo, 1954.
- J. Jordāq, al-Emām Ali: Ṣawt al-ʿadālat al-ensānīya, Beirut, 1958.
- ʿA. ʿAqqād, ʿAbqarīyat al-emām Ali, Cairo, 1961.
- M. Ḵalīlī, Zendagānī-e hażrat-e Ali, Tehran, 1342 Š./1963.
- Abd-al-Fattāḥ, al-Emām Ali, Cairo, n.d.
- ʿA. Ḵaṭīb, Ali b. Abī Taleb: Baqīyat al-nobūwa wa ḵātem al-ḵelāfa, Cairo, 1966.
- Ḵ. M. Ḵāled, Fī reḥāb Ali, Cairo, 1980.
- A. Oways and M. Āšūr, Rābeʿ al-rāšedīn Ali, Cairo, 1981.
- M. Ḡorayb, Ḵelāfat Ali, Cairo, 1982.